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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
defendant to be tried for all crimes known to the prosecutor when the
defendant is brought to trial, then the problem of complexity mentioned
before will 'be greatly magnified.
These reasons for opposing the adoption of the "same transaction"
test for double jeopardy apply, though with considerably less force, to
the adoption of collateral estoppel. It must be remembered, though, that
collateral estoppel has considerably less effect in curing the abuse of
harassment through multiple trials. However, collateral estoppel has a
preventive side that the total cure-the "same transaction" test for
double jeopardy-does not need. The prosecutor will be forced to try
the defendant for all of the crimes involved in a single transaction because
he cannot know beforehand what will result during the first trial. If he
first .brings the defendant to trial for only one crime in an attempt to feel
out the defense and test his approach, he may well be estopped from
proving a point vital to his prosecution in the subsequent trial for another
of the crimes. Where, heretofore, a multiple-crime transaction has given
the prosecutor virtually a free try at the defendant in which he could
discover the defenses and polish up his case, at least now the prosecutor
k nows that further trials may be foreclosed by the doctrine of collateral
estoppel.
After consideration of the policies involved, the result in Ashe appears
to have been the best alternative. The application of collateral estoppel
should result in better prepared prosecutions and less harassment of
defendants without some of the risks of the almost total exclusion of
multiple trials required by the adoption of the "same transaction" test
for determining double jeopardy.
BRUCE J. DOWNEY, III
Federal Courts-Choice of Controlling Law in Cases Involving
Federally Insured Mortgages
In a recent Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision, United States v.
Stadium Apartments, Inc.,' the court held that the Federal Housing
" Calling this a free try does, however, ignore the fact that the prosecution has
lost the opportunity to get additional punishment for the additional crime; but the
common practice of concurrent running of the sentences in an Ashe situation com-
bined with the small likelihood that a prosecutor, having secured one conviction,
would bring prosecutions on the other crimes minimizes this distinction.
'425 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1970).
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Authority was not subject to a state redemption statute. Stadium Apart-
ments secured an FHA insured loan from the Prudential Insurance Com-
pany; the mortgage included a provision waiving any right to redemp-
tion "to the extent permitted by law."2 Stadium Apartments defaulted,
and Prudential assigned the mortgage to the Secretary of Housing and
Urban Development who paid Prudential the amount due. The United
States secured by default judgment a foreclosure decree that, despite the
waiver provision, included a one-year redemption period as provided by
Idaho statute. The government appealed, arguing that the waiver of
redemption clause should have been upheld.
The court of appeals, finding the applicable law to be federal3 and
the state law regarding redemption not to have been adopted as the
federal rule,4 reversed the portion of the lower court decision providing for
a period of redemption.5 The dissent argued that deep-rooted equitable
redemptive rights were being cast aside in an unnecessary intrusion into
the legitimate local affairs of the states.6 While accepting "the assumption
that federal law is controlling," the dissent felt that effect should be given
"to the pertinent and equitable state law by incorporating it into the
federal program."7
In deciding which law will apply when faced with a situation similar"
2 Id. at 359.
3 Id. at 360, citing United States v. View Crest Garden Apts., Inc., 268 F.2d 380
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 884 (1959).
'425 F.2d at 367. The court felt that the adoption of the state's definition of first
mortgage was for commercial convenience and did not constitute an adoption of the
state law regarding the remedy. Id. at 361. Further the FHA was not viewed as
having adopted the state redemption statute by its regulations. Id. at 361-62.
Finally the court declined to adopt the local law of redemption itself, citing pro-
tection of the federal treasury, need for a uniform policy regarding FHA insured
loans, and prevention of administrative cost and difficulty as policy reasons against
adoption. Id. at 362-67.
5 Id. at 367.
° Id. at 367-68.
" Id. at 368. The dissent saw neither controlling precedent nor so great a burden
on the FHA in destroying uniformity or threatening the treasury that the state
redemption rule should not be adopted by the federal courts. Id. at 371.
'See, e.g., United States v. Merrick Sponsor Corp., 421 F.2d 1076 (2d Cir.
1970), a recent case in which the court applied federal law to uphold the govern-
ment's interest in an FHA insured loan despite a contrary state statute. After
Merrick Sponsor Corporation defaulted and the mortgage was assigned to the
Federal Housing Commissioner, the United States secured a foreclosure decree
authorizing a deficiency judgment. The deficiency judgment was awarded on motion
by the United States 133 days after the delivery of the deed despite a state statute
requiring such a motion to be made within ninety days. Id. at 1078. The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the deficiency judgment, holding the question to
be one of federal law under which there was no requirement or suggestion that the
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to that in Stadium Apartments, the court must face two questions.9 First,
is there authority for federal law to apply? If this is answered in the
affirmative, then the second question is reached. Should the federal court
adopt the state law as the federal rule?1 These separate questions have
been explicitly acknowledged by some courts.'1 Others, however, have
expressly declined to treat the questions separately,'12 leaving it "not clear
whether the court must apply state law, or whether it merely chooses the
state rule as an acceptable statement of federal law.""
In answering the question of whether there is authority for federal
law to apply, courts generally look to the constitutional mandate to apply
federal law' 4 and to the policy embodied in the Rules of Decision Act.'
The current line of authority to apply federal law in cases sufficiently
involving a federal function is bottomed primarily on Clearfield Trust
Co. v. United States," in which the rights and duties of the United States
on the commercial paper it issues were held to be governed by federal
rather than local law." The Court reasoned that "[w]hen the United
States disburses its funds or pays its debts, it is exercising a constitutional
function or power,""' and that "[i]n the absence of an applicable Act
state law be applied as the federal rule. Id. at 1078-79. The motion 133 days after
the delivery of the deed was not considered "untimely as a matter of federal law."
Id. at 1079.
9 See Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law, 39
N.Y.U.L. REv. 383, 410 (1964); Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law":
Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National and State Rides for Decision,
105 U. PA. L. REv. 797, 802, 805 (1957).
10 "The question of judicial incorporation can only arise in an area which is
sufficiently close to a national operation to establish competence in the federal courts
to choose the governing law, and yet not so close as clearly to require the application
of a single nationwide rule of substance." Mishkin, supra note 9, at 805.
"'E.g., United States v. Sommerville, 324 F.2d 712, 715 n.8 (3d Cir. 1964).
"2 E.g., "Since the federal and the state law are the same we need not decide
between them." United States v. Matthews, 244 F.2d 626, 633 (9th Cir. 1957) (con-
curring opinion).
1" Comment, Rides of Decision in Nondiversity Cases, 69 YALE L.J. 1428,
1442 (1960). See also Note, The Competence of Federal Courts to Formulate Rides
of Decision, 77 HARv. L. REv. 1084, 1099 (1964)."U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, § 2 (supremacy clause).
1528 U.S.C. § 1652 (1964). "The laws of the several states, except where the
Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require
or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of
the United States in cases where they apply."
1 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
'T Id. at 366. The extent of the holding in Clearfield, however, has been drawn
into some doubt. E.g., Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n v. Parnell,
352 U.S. 29 (1956). Nevertheless it has been applied in the field of federally
insured mortgages. See cases cited note 22 infra.
1-8 318 U.S. at 366.
[Vol. 49
FEDERALLY INSURED MORTGAGES
of Congress it is for the federal courts to fashion the governing rule of
law according to their own standards."19 The principle set down in
Clearfield was amplified by United States v. Allegheny County2 0 to in-
clude "every acquisition, holding, or disposition of property by the Federal
Government," 21 and was later refined to hold that the source of the law
governing the relations between the United States and the parties to a
government-insured mortgage to be federal.2 2 Other recent circuit court
decisions have held that "federal law applies in an action by the United
States to foreclose a mortgage insured by and assigned to the FHA."
' '
The court in Stadium Apartments answered the first question directly
and found the applicable law to be federal.24 In so doing it took a position
in accord with the developed law in the area.
After concluding that federal law should apply, the court then turned
to the second question of whether the state law was to be the federal rule.
In answering this question the court first looked to whether Congress or
the federal agency had adopted the state law to further federal policy. The
court concluded that the state redemption statutes had not been adopted
by the Congress 25 or by the FHA20 and thus faced the question whether it
should adopt judicially the state law as the federal rule. In decisions to
reject the local law as the federal rule, attention frequently has been given
to the intent of Congress and the policies underlying the particular federal
program.2 7 The court, in Stadium Apartments, inferred from Congress'
lack of express adoption of the state law and from the general policies
1 1 Id. at 367. One commentator maintains that "[t]he enduring contribution of
Clearfield is its clear establishment of power in the federal courts to select the
governing law in matters related to going operations of the national government."
Mishkin, supra note 9, at 833.
20322 U.S. 174 (1944).
2 I1d. at 182.
"United States v. View Crest Garden Apts., Inc., 268 F.2d 380, 382 (9th Cir.
1959) ; accord, Clark Inv. Co. v. United States, 364 F.2d 7 (9th Cir. 1966) ; United
States v. Flower Manor, Inc., 344 F.2d 958 (3d Cir. 1965) (per curiam) ; United
States v. Chester Park Apts., Inc., 332 F.2d 1 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
901 (1964), rehearing denied, 380 U.S. 927 (1965). In the area of Farmers Home
Administration security agreements, the third circuit held that federal law applied,
noting that "[w]hen there is a genuine federal interest, the Constitution or statutes
of the United States can be said to 'require' application of federal law." United
States v. Sommerville, 324 F.2d 712, 716 n.13 (3d Cir. 1964).
"United States v. Walker Park Realty, Inc., 383 F.2d 732, 733 (2d Cir. 1967)
(per curiam) ; accord, United States v. Wells, 403 F.2d 596 (5th Cir. 1968).
" 425 F.2d at 360.
2rId. at 361.
"Id. at 362."Friendly, supra note 9, at 410.
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embodied -in the national housing program a congressional nonintent to
adopt the local law. However, the dissent noted with persuasion that
Congress had consistently refused to enact bills that would have achieved
the same result as this case.2s
Another major factor considered by federal courts in formulating a
substantive rule rather than adopting the local law is the need for national
uniformity in the administration of the program. 29  This test frequently
is traced to the concern expressed in Clearfield that "application of state
law . . .would subject the rights and duties of the United States to
exceptional uncertainty."'8 Fearing such uncertainty among the twenty-
six states having various post-foreclosure redemption statutes, the court
in Stadium Apartments argued, "[i]t would be contrary to the teaching
of every case we have cited to hold that there is a different federal policy
in each state, thus making FHA 'subject to the vagaries of the laws of the
several states.' , However, the dissent argued that the decision would
render FHA financing less attractive in those states that have redemp-
tion statutes and suggested that a lack of uniformity would remain
between those states with overriden redemption provisions and those with
statutes that protect mortgagors and junior lienors in other ways.82 Fur-
thermore, the court's position appears weakened by its failure to explain
why uniformity of foreclosure proceedings for the FHA by nonallowance
of redemption rights is desirable for its own sake. When compared with
Clearfield, the federal interest in uniformity in Stadium Apartments does
not appear so great as in the issuance of commercial paper by the govern-
ment.as
Also pertinent in decisions not to adopt the local law is the protection
of the federal treasury. The coupling of this concern with that for uni-
28 425 F.2d at 372-73.
" Note, Federal Common Law-Married Women's Contracts, 16 BAYIor L.
Rxv. 412, 418 (1964).
8 318 U.S. at 367. This concern for uniformity is reflected in subsequent de-
cisions which declined to adopt the local law as the federal rule. E.g., United
States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 377 (1961); United States v. Standard Oil Co.,
332 U.S. 301, 309 (1947); United States v. Wells, 403 F.2d 596, 597-98 (5th Cir.
1968); United States v. Sommerville, 324 F.2d 712, 714-15 (3d Cir. 1964); United
States v. View Crest Garden Apts., Inc., 268 F.2d 380, 382 (9th Cir. 1959).
81425 F.2d at 364.2Id. at 369. "Some states provide for a statutory appraisal and prohibit fore-
closure for less than a certain percentage of that value, while other states depend on
anti-deficiency legislation and upset prices." Id. at n.1." While "a single piece of commercial paper issued by the United States may
easily be involved in several transactions in different states," the Stadium Apart-
ments situation involves "a single transaction within a single state." Id. at 371.
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formity generally is traced to United States v. Standard Oil Co.,a4 in which
the government sued to recover hospital expenses incurred for a soldier
who was injured by negligent action of an employee of Standard Oil. The
Court held that the relation between persons in the armed services and the
government derived from federal sources and declined to adopt the state
law 5 that would have denied recovery. 6 In United States v. View Crest
Garden Apartments, Inc.37 the court also invoked the principle of protec-
tion of the federal treasury to disregard a state law requiring a sufficient
showing of cause for the appointment of a receiver in the foreclosure of
a mortgage. The court noted that in the government's pursuit of remedies,
factors other than commercial convenience come into play.
Now the federal policy to protect the treasury and to promote the
security of federal investment which in turn promotes the prime pur-
pose of the Act-to facilitate the building of homes by the use of fed-
eral credit-becomes predominant. Local rules limiting the effectiveness
of the remedies available to the United States for breach of a federal
duty can not be adopted.38
Thus the majority position in Stadium Apartments appears strongest
in its contention that there is substantial precedent to apply federal law
to assure protection of the FHA from loss."9 However, the dissent
saw no reason why the government should not take the risk of redemption
since "[tihe very purpose of the entire federal housing program is
to provide badly needed housing that could not otherwise exist.
'" 40
8'332 U.S. 301 (1947).
Id. at 305-06.
Id. at 304 n.4.
The question, therefore, is chiefly one of federal fiscal policy, not of special
or peculiar concern to the states or their citizens. And because those matters
ordinarily are appropriate for uniform national treatment rather than diversi-
fied local disposition, as well where Congress has not acted affirmatively as
where it has, they are more fittingly determinable by independent federal
judicial decision than by reference to varying state policies.
Id. at 311. However the Court felt that the exercise of judicial power to establish
a new liability of the employer to the United States would intrude into an area
properly in the control of Congress and thus found no liability since Congress had
not acted. Id. at 316.
"" 268 F.2d 380 (9th Cir. 1959). The court allowed the appointment of a receiver
even though the state standards for appointment had not been met.
"' Id. at 383. Subsequent circuit court decisions have also cited protection of the
federal treasury in declining to adopt the local law. E.g., Clark Inv. Co. v. United
States, 364 F.2d 7, 9 (9th Cir. 1966); United States v. Sommerville, 324 F.2d 712,
716 (3d Cir. 1964).
8 425 F.2d at 362.
0 Id. at 371.
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In addition, the financial burden imposed on the FHA by the right of
redemption would be no greater than that for any other mortgagee in the
state and would not constitute an absolute or permanent frustration of
the agency's remedy.
Decisions to adopt local law as the federal rule rest upon other factors,
one of which is the traditional role of the states in defining family and
property relationships.41 In United States v. Yazel 42 the Supreme Court
applied the Texas law of coverture to bar a deficiency judgment for the
government on a Small Business Administration loan. The Court asserted
that state interests in the field of family and family-property arrangements
"should be overridden by the federal courts only where clear and sub-
stantial interests of the National Government, which cannot be served
consistently with respect for such state interests, will suffer major damage
if the state law is applied."4 While this might have been taken to
encourage the adoption of the local law in the area of property, the majority
in Stadium Apartments distinguished Yazell on its language.
44
A second factor that must be considered is the local nature of the
activity. In Bumb v. United States4 5 the circuit court declined to cast
aside the requirements of the California Bulk Sales Statute to sustain a
chattel mortgage for the SBA because of the local nature of the trans-
action." In the Stadium Apartments situation the FHA engrafted part
of the local system of property relations when it defined first mortgage in
terms of the state law. After default it proceeded in a foreclosure action
on a given transaction in a single state. The context of the relationship
thus appears more local than national in its character.
"' Note, 27 U. PiTr. L. Rnv. 712, 714 (1966); e.g., Fink v. O'Neil, 106 U.S. 272
(1882).
2 382 U.S. 341 (1966).
Is Id. at 352.
4"The Court in Yazell limited its holding in that "material to the resolution of
the issue presented" [whether to apply the Texas law of coverture to a loan from
the SBA to a husband and wife] was the fact that the loan was "individually
negotiated in painfully particularized detail, and... with specific reference to Texas
law .... " Id. at 345-46.
The Stadium Apartments dissent, however, relied on Yazell in framing its test-
"whether the state law can be given effect without either conflicting with federal
policy or destroying needed uniformity in the pertinent federal law in its operation
within the various states." 425 F.2d at 368 (dissenting opinion).
" 276 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1960).
,16 Id. at 738.
In acquiring security interests, the Small Business Administration is en-
gaging in local activity and in an essentially local transaction. We are un-
able to conclude that any federal policy in this case requires us to override
the sound and well-established policy of the several states which have a vital
interest in the protection of local property rights and local creditor citizens.
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A final factor is the perceived intent of the Congress. The court in
United States v. Kramel'7 considered the adoption of state law to be a
"matter of inclusion or exclusion governed by the intent (express or im-
plied) of Congress as suited to the situation in the particular case."'48 As
already observed, the apparent intent of Congress in not adopting measures
to abridge the local right of redemption militates against the abrogation of
the local law in the case of Stadium Apartments.9
While these factors can suggest a tentative answer to the question
whether to adopt state law as the federal rule, they do not exhaust the rele-
vant considerations. Decisions to adopt or not adopt state law have sig-
nificant impact on the operation of the American federalistic system8 ° and
should be made in the context of the policies that support that system. One
partial solution to the problem of balancing federal interests and state policy
is suggested by noting that from the Rules of Decision Act through Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins1 there is embodied
the tacit assumption that legal rights and obligations do not attach to
a transaction or occurrence unless a competent lawmaking authority
creates them. The act regards the states as the sources of the rights
and obligations which govern day-to-day relations except where the
Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States otherwise re-
quire or provide.
8 2
If the philosophy of the Rules of Decision Act is applied in answering the
second question of whether to adopt the local law as the federal rule, a
presumption will arise that the state law is adopted." This presumption
could be rebutted by a showing of sufficient federal interest for rejection
of the local law as the federal rule. Since the federal law is interstitial in
nature, building upon the legal relationships established by the states, 5
the state law becomes the primary basis by which men order much of their
everyday affairs. 5 To be able to order their affairs effectively they must
'1234 F.2d 577 (8th Cir. 1956). Kramel involved conversion of livestock that
was included in a chattel mortgage held by the Farmers Home Administration.
8 Id. at 580. "[I]t would require a very clearly expressed intent so to invade
a field of control [title to real and personal property] which has always been
regarded as peculiarly belonging to the States exclusively." Id. at 582-83.
,0 425 F.2d at 372-73 (dissenting opinion).
"Friendly, supra note 9, at 422.
"304 U.S. 64 (1938).
Note, The Competence of Federal Courts to Formulate Rules of Decision, 77
HARV. L. REV. 1084, 1085 (1964).
"Note, The Federal Common Law, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1512, 1517 (1969).
"H. HART & H. WEcHSLER, THE F .DERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEm
435 (1953) (hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLER).
. Id. at 634.
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have some degree of certainty in advance about the rules by which they
are to conduct their daily business."
In Stadium Apartments the court by rejecting the local law of redemp-
tion changed a basic premise under which the parties entered into the
mortgage agreement. The parties hardly could have been expected to
anticipate such a decision since the FHA previously had consented to
decrees including provision for redemption rights under the state law.57
Arguably all parties to future mortgage agreements are now on notice to
expect different treatment of the right of redemption in an FHA insured
mortgage. However, there remains the burden not only of recognizing
two laws of redemption for mortgages executed in the state but also of
anticipating in what other areas of mortgage law the previously accepted
state law may be cast aside in favor of formulating a federal rule.
Thus the import of this decision is to diminish the certainty of the
primary law that constitutes the basic framework of daily life."8 The
implications of this erosion of certainty have been viewed with concern
by scholars such as Henry Hart, who observed that "[p] eople repeatedly
subjected, like Pavlov's dogs, to two or more inconsistent sets of direc-
tions, without means of resolving the inconsistencies, could not fail in the
end to react as the dogs did. The society, collectively, would suffer a
nervous breakdown."59 While the decision in Stadium Apartments will
not in itself precipitate a national nervous breakdown, the extent to which
it contradicts the expectation of a party involved renders the law less
certain and less able to serve as a guide to conduct. 0
A final consideration is the impact that decisions not to adopt the state
law and to formulate a federal rule may have on the already overloaded
docket of the federal courts, and consequently on the courts' efficiency and
clarity of decision. Each decision to reject state law and to formulate a
federal rule brings another issue into the federal courts, which may require
further explanation by the lower courts or consideration by the Supreme
Court if the desired uniformity of federal rule is to be achieved among
all the circuit courts. Yet Judge Friendly has noted that the nation's
judicial business has grown "far beyond the capacity of any single court
"' Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUm. L. Zrv. 489
(1954). See also HART & WECHSLER 634.
United States v. Stadium Apts., Inc., 425 F.2d 358, 360 (9th Cir. 1970).
• Hart, supra note 56, at 491.
Id. at 489.




to preserve uniformity by the force of example."" Thus a decision to
reject the state law as the federal rule induces confusion regarding the
primary rules of conduct in two ways: first, by posing two laws on the
same subject and raising doubts about the viability of other state rules;
and second, by injecting imprecision through hurried opinions and con-
flicting decisions among the circuits.
When, as in Stadium Apartments, a court chooses to reject the
state law as the federal rule, it should face squarely the impact of that
decision on the certainty and clarity of its guides to future conduct,
especially in an area such as the law of property where the state law is
widely presumed to apply and in fact is applied to govern the relations of
the parties. The local rule should be rejected only when a sufficient federal
interest warrants intrusion into the traditional ambit of the local guides to
conduct and the resulting confusion for those who rely on them to plan
their future transactions is justified. In Stadium Apartments the con-
sequences to the federal system were not confronted directly nor was
there an adequate showing of the requisite federal interest to warrant
the result obtained.
KENNETH C. DAY
Federal Jurisdiction-Derivative Jurisdiction Upon Removal
"[P] rompt, economical, and sound administration of justice depends
upon definite and finally accepted principles governing important areas of
litigation, such as the respective jurisdictions of federal and state
courts .... ,1 One such principle is derivative jurisdiction in the removal
area; title 28, United States Code, section 14412 allows removal at de-
" Friendly, supra note 9, at 405. See also Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in
the District Courts, 53 CoLum. L. R-v. 157, 158 (1953).
2 American Fire and Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6,8 (1951). Defendant, who had
removed on grounds of diversity, lost on the merits in federal court. On appeal he
asked that the case be remanded because of jurisdictional shortcomings, and the
Court in an opinion written by Justice Reed granted his request, feeling that the
ends of justice would be better served through strict enforcement of jurisdictional
requirements.
. The text of 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1964) concerns actions removable generally:
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil
action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United
States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant .. to the
district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the
place where such action is pending.
(b) Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction
founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws
1971]
